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Abstract In this article, we model FPTP systems as social preference rules and
give two characterizations. We show that a social preference rule is an FPTP sys-
tem if, and only if, it satisfies the axioms of subset consistency, district consistency,
subset cancellation, and district cancellation. The second characterization consists of
the axioms of subset consistency, subset anonymity, neutrality, topsonlyness, Pareto
optimality, district consistency and district cancellation. The characterizations give us
an opportunity to compare the characteristic properties of FPTP systems to the char-
acteristic properties that we found for list systems of proportional representation (list
PR systems) in Hout et al. (Social Choice and Welfare, 27:459–475, 2006), where we
modelled those systems also as social preference rules. We find that consistency and
anonymity distinguish list PR systems from FPTP systems. On the other hand, it is
district cancellation that distinguishes FPTP systems from list PR systems.
Keywords Social choice · FPTP systems · Plurality ranking rule
1 Introduction
In Hout et al. (2006), we gave characterizations of the list systems of proportional
representation (list PR systems) that are used in most West European countries to
choose representatives. We modelled these systems as social preference rules. These
are rules that assign to each combination of individual preference orderings of the
parties a social ordering of these parties, as it may be reflected in the number of seats
that each party is assigned. Since in a list PR system, parties are assigned a number
of seats in parliament that is proportional to the number of votes they received, we
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modelled it as a social preference rule that ranks a party higher (assigns more seats)
when it is the first preference of more voters (receives more first votes). This rule is
known as the plurality ranking rule.
A second class of rules that are used in Western democracies to choose represen-
tatives, are the so-called first past the post (FPTP) systems (Lijphart 1994; Farrell
1997). In these systems, the electorate is assigned to a large number of districts in
each of which one single representative is chosen using the plurality rule. Therefore,
in each district the candidate who received the most votes wins the single seat. This
means that a party x receives more seats than a party y if the number of districts in
which a candidate of party x wins a plurality of the votes is larger than the number of
districts in which a candidate of party y wins a plurality of the votes. Because of that,
in this article, we model FPTP systems as social preference rules that rank a party x
before a party y (respectively equal to y) if the number of constituencies, in which
x is ranked first by the largest number of voters, is larger than (respectively equal
to) the number of constituencies in which y is ranked first by the largest number of
voters.
A good example of an FPTP system is the British electoral system. The British
electorate is assigned to approximately 659 districts, in each of which one single rep-
resentative is chosen using the plurality rule. Other examples of countries that use
such a single-member plurality system are the U.S. and Canada.
We give two characterizations of the FPTP systems, using axioms that resemble the
axioms that were used in Hout (2006). These characterizations give us an opportunity,
not only to evaluate FPTP systems on the basis of their characteristic properties, but
also to compare them to the characteristic properties for list PR systems that we found
in Hout (2006). In the final sections of this article, we make such a comparison.
List PR systems and FPTP systems embody two different views on representation,
which are distinguished by Pitkin (1967). According to descriptive representation that
is associated with systems of proportional representation, parliament should be repre-
sentative in the sense that it includes the same proportion of each relevant subgroup as
the population at large. Systems like the British system, on the other hand, are associ-
ated with substantive representation. In this conception, representatives are agents that
act on behalf of others. Parliament need not contain the same subgroups as the popula-
tion, but needs to act on behalf of the electorate. Thus, the two categories of electoral
systems seem to have been designed with different goals. Because of this, both kinds
of systems, i.e. both sets of characteristic axioms, may be defendable, although based
on two different views on representation.
2 Preliminaries
Let V be a finite set of voters. Since in practice not all voters will cast their vote, we
want our social preference rule to be applicable to finite, nonempty subsets I of V .
The set of alternatives, in this case (candidates of) political parties, will be identified
with A. R ⊆ A × A will be conceived of as a preference relation. This means that the
statement (x, y) ∈ R will be interpreted in the sense that x ∈ A is at least as good as
y ∈ A. A preference relation R is a weak ordering on A if R is complete and transitive.
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R is a linear ordering on A if R is complete, transitive and antisymmetric. The set of
all weak orderings on A will be denoted by W (A) and the set of all linear orderings
on A will be denoted by L(A).
We assume that each individual i ∈ V orders the parties in a strict way, i.e., for all
i ∈ V , Ri ∈ L(A). For each I ⊆ V , a specific combination of linear orderings on A
of the individuals in I , the so-called preference profile on I , can thus be formulated
as a function c : I → L(A). The set of all preference profiles on I is equal to L(A)I .
For the linear ordering of individual i ∈ I in preference profile c on I , we will write
ci . x ci y denotes that x occurs before y in the individual ordering ci of voter i ∈ I .
t (ci ) = x denotes that x is the top of ci . For c ∈ L(A)I , πc(x) = | {i ∈ I | t (ci ) = x} |,
i.e., the number of voters in I who have x as their first preference.
The set of individuals may be divided into constituencies. This fact can be for-
malized as follows. Let  = {δ1, . . . , δm} be a partition of the set of voters V , i.e.,
(i) for all δ ∈ , δ ⊆ V ; (ii) for all δ′, δ′′ ∈ , if δ′ = δ′′, then δ′ ∩ δ′′ = ∅;
(iii) ∪{δ | δ ∈ } = V . The partition  of V will be interpreted as a division of
the voters in V into constituencies. For each I ⊆ V ,  induces a partition I of I ;
I = {δ1 ∩ I, . . . , δm ∩ I }.
For a profile c ∈ L(A)I , a partition  of V induces the so-called district profiles
on each δ ∩ I , that can be formulated as functions cδ : δ ∩ I → L(A), where cδ is
the restriction of c to δ ∩ I . The number of individuals in δ ∩ I with x at the top of
their individual preference ranking will be denoted by πcδ (x). Therefore, for δ ∈ ,
I ⊆ V , and x ∈ A,
πcδ (x) =| {i ∈ δ ∩ I | t (ci ) = x} | .
The number of constituencies in which x is ranked first by the largest number of
voters is denoted by τc (x). Formally, for I ⊆ V , δ ∈ , and x ∈ A, we define ‘x is
preferred most in district δ given profile c ∈ L(A)I ’ by πcδ (x) ≥ πcδ (z) for all z ∈ A.
For I ⊆ V , c ∈ L(A)I , and x ∈ A,
τc (x) =| {δ ∩ I ∈ I | x is preferred most in δ ∩ I given c} | .
Given a set of voters I and a partition  of V , a social preference rule is a function
F : L(A)I → W (A).
Thus, for each finite set I of voters, and for every partition  of V , a social preference
rule assigns to each preference profile c ∈ L(A)I a weak (social) ordering F(c) of
the parties. By definition,
t (F(c)) = {x ∈ A | x is a top element of F(c)}.
Typically, t (F(c)) will contain just one element, but society might be indifferent
with respect to two or more parties.
Since in FPTP systems every voter is allowed to cast one single vote, a voter can
only vote for the party that is ordered first in his individual preference ordering. A
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voter may, of course, strategically misrepresent his preferences and vote, for example,
for the party that is ordered second in his individual preference ordering. However, in
this article, we only describe how the individual linear orderings, manipulated or not,
are transformed to a (weak) social ordering over the parties. After the votes have been
cast, they are summarized, and party x receives more seats than party y if the number
of districts in which a candidate of party x wins a plurality of the votes is larger than
the number of districts in which a candidate of party y wins a plurality of the votes.
Hence, we may model FPTP systems as social preference rules that rank a party x
before a party y (respectively equal to y) if the number of constituencies in which x
is ranked first by the largest number of voters is larger than (respectively equal to) the
number of constituencies in which y is ranked first by the largest number of voters.
Definition 1 (FPTP) The function FPTP : L(A)I → W (A), for I ⊆ V , is defined
by
x F PT P(c) y iff τc (x) ≥ τc (y).
Although we define both list PR systems and FPTP systems as social preference
rules, the definition of a social preference rule we use in both characterizations is
slightly different. A list PR system is defined as a function F : L(A)I → W (A), for
each I ⊆ V , while an FPTP system was defined as a function F : L(A)I → W (A)
for each I ⊆ V , where  is a partition of V . However, list PR systems can also be
applied to sets of voters that are assigned to constituencies. List PR systems differ
from FPTP systems in the fact that the former do not make use of this assignment to
constituencies when assigning a social ordering to a preference profile. Therefore, for
list PR systems, we can also write F instead of F .
Definition 2 (Plurality ranking rule) The plurality ranking rule Pl : L(A)I → W (A),
for I ⊆ V , is defined by:
x Pl(c) y iff πc(x) ≥ πc(y).
3 Axioms for social preference rules
By consistency (Young 1974; Nitzan and Rubinstein 1981) of a social preference rule
F, we mean that if two disjoint sets of voters I and J both socially prefer x to y
using F, their union should also socially prefer x to y using F.
Definition 3 (Consistency) A social preference rule F is consistent if whenever
c ∈ L(A)I , c′ ∈ L(A)J are preference profiles for disjoint sets of voters I ⊆ V and
J ⊆ V and c + c′ is the profile on I ∪ J that corresponds with c on I and with c′ on
J , for all x, y ∈ A:
if x F(c) y and x F(c′) y, then x F(c+c′) y.
Clearly, F PT P is not consistent, as the following example shows.
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Counterexample 1 δ1 = {1, 2}, δ2 = {3, 4, 5}, I = {1, 2, 3}, J = {4, 5}.
1 δ1 y y
I 2 y y
3 x x
4 δ2 x x
J 5 x x
c c′ c + c′
δ2 ∩ I = ∅, δ2 ∩ J = ∅.
x ∼F PT P(c) y and x F PT P(c′) y, but not x F PT P(c+c′) y. This also holds if
δ1 = {1, 2, 4} and δ2 = {3, 5}, in which case the intersection of both I and J with
each of δ1, δ2 is non-empty.
However, if one demands that every δ ∈  having a non-empty intersection with
I does have an empty intersection with J , then consistency is preserved, as will be
shown in Proposition 2.
FPTP also does satisfy subset consistency. Subset consistency relates the choices
made by disjoint subsets of a particular constituency, to choices made by their union.
It requires that if two sets of voters within the same constituency use the same social
preference rule and the tops of the social orderings they choose have at least one
element in common, then the top of the social ordering that is chosen by their union
should contain exactly these shared elements.
Definition 4 (Subset Consistency) Let I δ⊆δ⊆V and J δ⊆δ⊆V be disjoint subsets of
one single constituency δ. A social preference rule is subset consistent if, whenever
cδ ∈ L(A)I δ and c′δ ∈ L(A)J
δ
are preference profiles for I δ and J δ , and cδ + c′δ is
the profile on I δ ∪ J δ that corresponds with cδ on I δ and with c′δ on J δ , t (F(cδ)) ∩
t (F(c′δ)) = ∅ implies t (F(cδ + c′δ)) = t (F(cδ)) ∩ t (F(c′δ)).
Proposition 1 FPTP satisfies subset consistency.
Proof Let δ ∈ , let cδ ∈ L(A)I δ and c′δ ∈ L(A)J
δ be preference profiles for disjoint
sets of voters I δ ⊆ δ and J δ ⊆ δ, and cδ + c′δ be the profile on I δ ∪ J δ that corre-
sponds with cδ on I δ and with c′δ on J δ . Let t (F PT P(cδ)) ∩ t (F PT P(c′δ)) = ∅.
Then, for all x ∈ t (F PT P(cδ)) ∩ t (F PT P(c′δ)), τcδ (x) = 1 and τc′δ (x) = 1
and thus πcδ (x) ≥ πcδ (y) for all y ∈ A and πc′δ (x) ≥ πc′δ (y) for all y ∈ A. Since
I δ ∩ J δ = ∅, for all x ∈ A, πcδ+c′δ (x) = πcδ (x) + πc′δ (x). Thus, if τcδ (x) = 1 and
τ
c′δ
(x) = 1, then τ
cδ+c′δ (x) = 1. So, if x ∈ t (F PT P(cδ)) ∩ t (F PT P(c
′
δ)), then
x ∈ t (F PT P(cδ + c′δ)).
Conversely, suppose z ∈ t (F PT P(cδ+c′δ)), thus τcδ+c′δ (z) = 1. Let x ∈ t (F PT P
(cδ))∩t (F PT P(c′δ)) = ∅, thus τcδ (x) = 1 and τc′δ (x) = 1. If z /∈ t (F PT P(cδ)) or
z /∈ t (F PT P(c′δ)), then τcδ (z) = 0 or τc′δ (z) = 0. So, πcδ (x) > πcδ (z) or πc′δ (x) >
πc′δ (z). Consequently, πcδ+c′δ (x) > πcδ+c′δ (z) and, thus, τ

cδ+c′δ (z) = 0. This contra-
dicts z ∈ t (F PT P(cδ + c′δ)). Hence, z ∈ t (F PT P(cδ)) and z ∈ t (F PT P(c′δ)).unionsq
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The second new axiom we introduce here is district consistency. District consis-
tency is similar to the usual consistency, with the proviso that the two sets of voters
in question are not only disjoint, but both do not contain elements of a same constit-
uency either. Note that in our counterexample 1 above, showing that F PT P is not
consistent, this proviso is violated: in this example, both I and J contain elements of
the constituency δ2.
Definition 5 (District Consistency). A social preference rule F is district consistent
if, whenever c ∈ L(A)I , and c′ ∈ L(A)J are preference profiles for disjoint sets of
voters I ⊆ V and J ⊆ V , such that for all δ ∈ , δ ∩ I = ∅ implies δ ∩ J = ∅, and
c + c′ is the profile on I ∪ J , that corresponds with c on I and with c′ on J , for all
x, y ∈ A: if x F(c) y and x F(c′) y, then x F(c+c′) y.
Proposition 2 FPTP satisfies district consistency.
Proof Let I ⊆ V and J ⊆ V be two sets of voters such that for all δ ∈ , δ ∩ I = ∅
implies δ ∩ J = ∅. Let c ∈ L(A)I , and c′ ∈ L(A)J be preference profiles for I ⊆ V
and J ⊆ V and let c+c′ be the profile on I ∪ J , that corresponds with c on I and with c′
on J . Let x, y ∈ A and let x F PT P(c) y and x F PT P(c′) y. Then τc (x) > τc (y)
and τ
c′ (x) ≥ τc′ (y). Since I ∩ J = ∅ and since for all δ ∈ , δ ∩ I = ∅ implies
δ ∩ J = ∅, for all x ∈ A, τ
c+c′(x) = τc (x) + τc′ (x). Hence, τc+c′(x) > τc+c′(y).
Hence, x F PT P(c+c′) y. unionsq
The third axiom in the characterization of F PT P resembles the FS-cancellation
axiom in Hout (2006). Here, FS refers to First Score in the sense that only the first
or top preferences of the voters are taken into account. In this sense, this notion is
different from the original notion in Young (1974); Nitzan and Rubinstein (1981).
Definition 6 (FS Cancellation). A social preference rule F has the FS cancellation
property if, for all I ⊆ V , for every c ∈ L(A)I , and for all x, y ∈ A, if πc(x) = πc(y),
then x ∼F(c) y.
FPTP does not satisfy FS cancellation, as the following example shows.
Counterexample 2 Let A = {x, y, z}, I = V = {1, . . . , 6},  = {δ1, δ2} with δ1 =
{1, 2, 3} and δ2 = {4, 5, 6}. Suppose t (c1) = t (c2) = x , t (c3) = t (c4) = y and
t (c5) = t (c6) = z. Then πc(x) = πc(y) = 2, but not x ∼F PT P(c) y, since x wins in
district δ1, while y wins in no district.
Subset cancellation demands that whenever a set of voters is a subset of one sin-
gle constituency and all alternatives that receive a nonzero vote total tie, the social
preference rule should rank this whole set of alternatives first.
Definition 7 (Subset Cancellation) A social preference rule F has the subset
cancellation property if, for all δ ∈ , for all I δ ⊆ δ ⊆ V , and for every cδ ∈ L(A)I δ ,
if for all parties x, y ∈ A with πcδ (x) = 0 and πcδ (y) = 0, πcδ (x) = πcδ (y), then
t (F(cδ)) = {x ∈ A | πcδ (x) = 0}.
Proposition 3 FPTP satisfies subset cancellation.
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Proof Let δ ∈ , let I δ ⊆ δ, and let cδ ∈ L(A)I δ be a preference profile. Let for all
parties x, y ∈ A with πcδ (x) = 0 and πcδ (y) = 0, πcδ (x) = πcδ (y). Then, for all
parties with πcδ (x) = 0 and πcδ (y) = 0, πcδ (x) = πcδ (y) ≥ πcδ (z) for all z ∈ A.
Thus, for all parties x, y ∈ A with πcδ (x) = 0 and πcδ (y) = 0, τcδ (x) = τcδ (y) = 1
and, thus, x, y ∈ t (F PT P(cδ)). Also, for all z ∈ A with πcδ (z) = 0, πcδ (z) <
πcδ (x) = πcδ (y) for all x, y ∈ A with πcδ (x) = 0 and πcδ (y) = 0. Thus, for all
parties z ∈ A with πcδ (z) = 0, τcδ (z) = 0 and, thus, z /∈ t (F PT P(cδ)). Hence,
t (F PT P(cδ)) = {x | πcδ (x) = 0}. unionsq
Finally, we define a property called district cancellation. A social preference rule
has the district cancellation property if it declares a tie between party x and party y in
case the number of constituencies in which x is preferred most by the largest number
of voters equals the number of constituencies in which y is preferred most by the
largest number of voters.
Definition 8 (District Cancellation) A social preference rule F has the district can-
cellation property if, for all I ⊆ V , for every c ∈ L(A)I , and for all x, y ∈ A, if
| {δ ∈  | x ∈ t (F(cδ))} | = | {δ ∈  | y ∈ t (F(cδ))} |, then x ∼F(c) y.
Proposition 4 FPTP satisfies district cancellation.
Proof First note that for any x ∈ A, any δ ∈ and for any profile c, x ∈ t (F PT P(cδ))
iff x is preferred most in δ given c. Now suppose that | {δ ∈  | x ∈ t (F PT P(cδ))} |
= | {δ ∈  | y ∈ t (F PT P(cδ))} |. Then τc (x) = τc (y) and hence, by definition,
x ∼F PT P(c) y. unionsq
In Sect. 7, we shall see that the Plurality ranking rule Pl satisfies all the axioms
mentioned so far except district cancellation, as shown by the following example.
Counterexample 3 A = {x, y, z},  = {δ}, δ = {1, 2, 3}, 1: x . . . ; 2: x . . . ; and 3:
y . . .. Then t (Pl(cδ)) = {x}. Hence, the number of districts with y at the top of Pl(cδ)
is 0. The same holds for z, but not y ∼Pl(cδ) z: y has more first votes than z.
4 A Characterization of FPTP systems
In this section, we prove that a social preference rule is F PT P, if and only if, it
satisfies subset consistency, district consistency, subset cancellation and district can-
cellation. In our proof, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let F : L(A)I → W (A). If F satisfies subset consistency and subset
cancellation, then for every δ ∈  with I δ = δ ∩ I = ∅, x ∈ t (F(cδ)), if and only
if, πcδ (x) ≥ πcδ (z) for all z ∈ A.
Proof First, we show that t (F(c∅)) = A. Let cδ be such that πcδ (x) = πcδ (y) > 0
for all x, y. By subset cancellation, t (F(cδ)) = A. Note that cδ = cδ + c∅ and
δ ∩ ∅ = ∅. By definition, t (F(c∅)) = ∅. Hence, t (F(c∅)) ∩ t (F(cδ)) = ∅, and
by subset consistency, t (F(cδ + c∅)) = t (F(cδ)) ∩ t (F(c∅)); that is t (F(cδ)) =
A = t (F(c∅)).
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(1) if-part: We prove this part by induction on the number of voters |I δ| = n. For
n = 1, there is only one voter i ∈ I δ . If πcδ (x) ≥ πcδ (z) for all z ∈ A, then
x = t (ci ), and by subset cancellation, we have x ∈ t (F(ci )).
Suppose that the assertion holds for all I δ with |I δ| ≤ n and let I δ ⊆ δ ⊆ V
be such that |I δ| = n + 1. Let x ∈ A with πcδ (x) ≥ πcδ (z) for all z ∈ A.
Let y1, y2, . . . , yk ∈ A be all parties with πcδ (x)=πcδ (y j ), j = 1, . . . , k. Let
I δ1 ={i, i1, i2, . . . , ik} ⊆ I δ such that t (ci )= x and t (ci j )= y j . Let I δ2 = I δ \ I δ1 ,
so that I δ = I δ1 ∪ I δ2 and I δ1 ∩ I δ2 =∅. The restrictions of cδ to I δ1 and I δ2 are c1δ
and c2δ .
Since |I δ2 | ≤ n and πc2δ (x) ≥ πc2δ (z) for all z ∈ A, by the induction hypothesis
we have x ∈ t (F(c2δ )). (In case I δ2 =∅, c2δ = c∅ and t (F(c2δ )) = t (F(c∅)) =
A.) By subset cancellation, we have x ∈ t (F(c1δ )). Hence,
t (F(c1δ ))∩t (F(c2δ )) = ∅ which gives, by subset consistency, x ∈ t (F(cδ)) =
t (F(c1δ + c2δ )) = t (F(c1δ )) ∩ t (F(c2δ )).
(2) only if part: Suppose that there exists a z ∈ A with z ∈ t (F(cδ)) and πcδ (y) >
πcδ (z) for some y ∈ A. Choose x ∈ A such that πcδ (x) ≥ πcδ (z) for all z ∈ A.




δ and c2δ be defined as in part (1). Then, by the result of part 1, we
have x ∈ t (F(c2δ )) and x ∈ t (F(c1δ )). By subset cancellation, we have that
z ∈ t (F(c1δ )). By subset consistency, it follows that z ∈ t (F(cδ)). Contradic-
tion. unionsq
Theorem 1 Let F : L(A)I → W (A), for I ⊆ V , be a social preference rule. Then
F is F PT P, if and only if, F is subset consistent and district consistent and has
the subset cancellation property and the district cancellation property.
The ‘only if’ part is established by Propositions 1,2, 3 and 4.
Proof of the ‘if’ part: The proof of the if-part of the equivalence resembles in some
respects the proof of Theorem 1 in Hout (2006). Let F : L(A)I → W (A), for I ⊆ V ,
be a social preference rule that satisfies these conditions. Let I ⊆ V and let c ∈ L(A)I .
We should prove that for all x, y ∈ A,
x F(c) y, iff, x F PT P(c) y, i.e. iff τc (x) > τc (y) and
x ∼F(c) y, iff, x ∼F PT P(c) y, i.e. iff τc (x) = τc (y).
It is sufficient to show that
(1) If τc (x) = τc (y), then x ∼F(c) y. Thus, if | {δ ∩ I ∈ I | x is preferred most
in district δ given c} |=| {δ ∩ I ∈ I | y is preferred most in district δ given c} |,
then x ∼F(c) y.
(2) If τc (x) > τc (y), then x F(c) y. Thus, if | {δ ∩ I ∈ I | x is preferred most
in district δ given c} | > | {δ ∩ I ∈ I | y is preferred most in district δ given
c} |, then x F(c) y.
For suppose x ∼F(c) y and not τc (x) = τc (y), then either τc (x) > τc (y) or
τc (x) < τ

c (y). If τc (x) > τc (y), then by (2) x F(c) y. If τc (x) < τc (y), then
by (2), y F(c) x . This is a contradiction. Hence, if x ∼F(c) y, then τc (x) = τc (y).
Similarly, if x F(c) y, then τc (x) > τc (y).
Proof of (1): Suppose τc (x) = τc (y). Then | {δ ∈  | x ∈ t (F(cδ))} | = | {δ ∈  |
y ∈ t (F(cδ))} |. Hence, by district cancellation, x ∼F(c) y.
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Proof of (2): Suppose τc (x) > τc (y). Then there are I ′, I ′′ ⊆ I such that:
– I = I ′ ∪ I ′′, I ′ ∩ I ′′ = ∅.
– for c′ being the restriction of c to I ′, τ
c′ (x) = τc′ (y).
– c′′, being the restriction of c to I ′′, is such that for all δ ∈  with δ ∩ I ′′ = ∅,
πc′′δ (x) ≥ πc′′δ (z) for all z ∈ A and πc′′δ (x) > πc′′δ (y).
Notice that I ′′ = ∅. By district cancellation, x ∼F(c′) y (i).
By Lemma 1, for every δ ∈  with δ ∩ I ′′ = ∅, x ∈ t (F(c′′δ )), if and only if,
πc′′δ (x) ≥ πc′′δ (z) for all z ∈ A. This means that for every such δ, x ∈ t (F(c′′δ ))
and y /∈ t (F(c′′δ )), since, for every such δ, πc′′δ (x) ≥ πc′′δ (z) for all z ∈ A and
πc′′δ (x) > πc′′δ (y). Thus, for each such δ, x F(c′′δ ) y. This means that, by district
consistency, x F(c′′) y (ii). Given (i) and (ii), by district consistency, x F(c) y.unionsq
5 Deeper axioms for social preference rules
In this section, we introduce a number of properties which together imply the subset
cancellation property (Lemma 2); for that reason, we speak of deeper axioms. Ano-
nymity means that it does not matter who casts which vote; the names of the voters
are irrelevant. In other words, all voters are treated equally.
Definition 9 (Anonymity) F is anonymous := for all I ⊆ V , for every permutation
σ of I , and for all preference profiles c ∈ L(A)I , F(c ◦ σ) = F(c).
Clearly, Pl is anonymous, but F PT P is not, as shown by the following example.
Counterexample 4 Let A = {x, y, z}, I = V = {1, . . . , 6},  = {δ1, δ2} with δ1 =
{1, 2, 3} and δ2 = {4, 5, 6}, σ(1) = 4 and σ(4) = 1. Let profile c be as indicated in
the table below.
c c ◦ σ
1 x . . . y . . .
δ1 2 x . . . x . . .
3 y . . . y . . .
4 y . . . x . . .
δ2 5 z . . . z . . .
6 z . . . z . . .
τc (x) = 1 and τc (y) = 0 and τc (z) = 1. But τc◦σ (x) = 0 and τc◦σ (y) = 1 and
τc◦σ (z) = 1. Hence, F PT P(c ◦ σ) = F PT P(c).
Hence, FPTP is not anonymous, but it is clearly subset anonymous. A social pref-
erence rule is called subset anonymous if it treats all voters equally in case society
consists of (a subset of) one single constituency.
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Definition 10 (Subset Anonymity). A social preference rule F is subset anonymous
if, for all δ ∈ , for all I δ ⊆ δ, for every permutation σ of I δ , and for all preference
profiles cδ ∈ L(A)I δ , F(cδ ◦ σ) = F(cδ).
Proposition 5 FPTP is subset anonymous.
Proof For all δ ∈ , for all I δ ⊆ δ, for every permutation σ of I δ , for all prefer-
ence profiles cδ ∈ L(A)I δ , and for all x ∈ A, for all i ∈ I δ , π(c◦σ)i (x) = πcσ(i) (x).
Hence, for all δ ∈  and for all x ∈ A, πcδ◦σ (x) = πcδ (x) and, thus, τcδ◦σ = 1, iff,
τcδ (x) = 1. Hence, F PT P(cδ ◦ σ) = F PT P(cδ). unionsq
We are able to show that subset cancellation is implied by subset anonymity,
neutrality, topsonlyness, and Pareto optimality. Neutrality and topsonlyness are defined
as usual. Neutrality requires that all parties are treated equally, where topsonlyness
requires that whenever for two profiles the tops of the individual preference orderings
correspond, the social outcome should be the same for both profiles.
Definition 11 (Neutrality) A social preference rule F is neutral if, for every permu-
tation λ of A, for all I ⊆ V , and for every preference profile c ∈ L(A)I , F(λc) =
λF(c).
Proposition 6 FPTP is neutral.
Proof For every permutation λ of A, for all I ∈ V , for every preference profile c ∈
L(A)I , and for all x ∈ A, τλc(λ(x)) = τc (x). Thus, F PT P(λc) = λF PT P(c).unionsq
Definition 12 (Topsonlyness) A social preference rule F is topsonly if, whenever
c, c′ ∈ L(A)I are such that for all i ∈ I and for all x ∈ A, t (ci ) = x iff t (c′i ) = x ,
F(c) = F(c′).
Proposition 7 FPTP is topsonly.
Proof Suppose that c, c′ ∈ L(A)I are such that for all i ∈ I and for all x ∈ A,
t (ci ) = x iff t (c′i ) = x . Then for all δ ∈  and for all x ∈ A, πcδ (x) = πc′δ (x) and,
thus, for all x ∈ A, τc (x) = τc′ (x). Hence, FPTP(c) = FPTP(c′). unionsq
Pareto optimality requires that, whenever all individuals prefer x to y, then y is not
ranked first socially.
Definition 13 (Pareto optimality) A social preference rule F is Pareto optimal if,
for all parties x, y ∈ A, for all I ⊆ V , and for all preference profiles c ∈ L(A)I : if
x ci y for all i ∈ I , then y /∈ t (F(c)).
Proposition 8 FPTP is Pareto optimal.
Proof Let x, y ∈ A, let I ⊆ V , and let c ∈ L(A)I be such that x ci y for all i ∈ I .
Then for all i ∈ I , t (ci ) = y. Hence, for each δ ∈  there is some zδ ∈ A, zδ = y
such that πcδ (zδ) > πcδ (y), and, thus τcδ (y) = 0. Hence, there is some party v ∈ A,
v = y, such that τc (v) > τc (y) and, thus, y /∈ t (F PT P(c)). unionsq
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Lemma 2 If F is subset anonymous, neutral, topsonly, and Pareto optimal, then F
has the subset cancellation property.
Proof Let F be subset anonymous, neutral, topsonly, and Pareto optimal. Let δ ∈ 
and let cδ ∈ L(A)I δ be such that for all parties x, y ∈ A with πcδ (x) = 0 and πcδ (y) =
0, πcδ (x) = πcδ (y). We should prove that t (F(cδ)) = {x ∈ A | πcδ (x) = 0}.
For a set of parties {x, y} ⊆ A with πcδ (x) = 0 and πcδ (y) = 0, let 1, 2, . . . , k be
the voters that voted for x and let k + 1, . . . 2k be the voters that voted for y. Let σ be
the permutation of I δ in which for all i ∈ {1, . . . , 2k}, σ(i) = 2k − (i − 1), and for
all other voters σ(i) = i . Since F is subset anonymous, we have
F(cδ ◦ σ) = F(cδ) (1)
Let λ be the permutation of A with λ(x) = y, λ(y) = x and λ(z) = z for all z ∈ A,
z = x , z = y. Since F is neutral, it follows that
F(λcδ) = λF(cδ) (2)
Since cδ ◦ σ and λcδ are such that, for all i ∈ I δ and for all x ∈ A, t (c ◦ σ)i = x iff
t (λci ) = x , by topsonlyness we have
F(cδ ◦ σ) = F(λcδ) (3)
By (1), (2) and (3) it follows that
F(cδ) = λF(cδ). (4)
Hence, for each set of parties {x, y} ⊆ A with πcδ (x) = 0 and πcδ (y) = 0, we have
that
x ∈ t (F(cδ)) iff y ∈ t (F(cδ)) (5)
Now there are two cases:
1. There are no parties z ∈ A with πcδ (z) = 0. This means that t (F(cδ)) = {x |
πx (cδ) = 0}.
2. There is at least one party z ∈ A with πcδ (z) = 0. In this case, it is possible to
construct a profile c′δ ∈ L(A)I
δ
such that t (c′δi ) = t (cδi ) for all i ∈ I δ and such
that there exists a party x such that for all parties z ∈ A with πcδ (z) = 0, x c′δi z
for all i ∈ I δ . By topsonlyness, we have
F(c′δ) = F(cδ). (6)
By Pareto optimality, we have for all parties z ∈ A with πcδ (z) = 0
z /∈ t (F(c′δ)) (7)
By (5), (6) and (7), it follows that t (F(cδ)) = {x | πcδ (x) = 0}. unionsq
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Theorem 2 Let F : L(A)I → W (A), for I ⊆ V , be a social preference rule.
Then F is F PT P, if and only if, F is subset consistent, district consistent, sub-
set anonymous, neutral, topsonly, Pareto optimal, and has the district cancellation
property.
Proof The ‘only if’ part is shown by Propositions 1–8. In Lemma 2 it was shown that
subset anonymity, neutrality, topsonlyness, and Pareto optimality imply the subset
cancellation property. By Theorem1, subset cancellation, district cancellation, subset
consistency, and district consistency imply an FPTP-system. unionsq
6 Independence of the properties
The properties mentioned in Theorem 1 are independent.
Proposition 9 Subset cancellation, district cancellation, subset consistency, and dis-
trict consistency are independent.
Proof A function that does not satisfy subset cancellation, but does satisfy the other
properties is the function F1 : L(A)I → W (A), for I ⊆ V , defined by x F1(c) y,
iff, βc (x) ≥ βc (y), where βc (x) := | {δ ∩ I ∈ I | Borda score (cδ, x) ≥ Borda
score (cδ, y) for all y ∈ A} |.
A function that satisfies all properties but district cancellation is the function F2 :
L(A)I → W (A), for I ⊆ V , defined by x F2(c) y, iff, district Borda score (c, x)
given  ≥ district Borda score (c, y) given . Here, district Borda score (c, x) given
 := a score of m − a, m being the number of parties, each time x is preferred most
by the ath most voters in a particular district δ, summed over all districts δ ∈  with
δ ∩ I = ∅.
A function that satisfies all properties but subset consistency is the function F3 :
L(A)I → W (A), for I ⊆ V , defined by x F3(c) y, iff, γ c (x) ≥ γ c (y), where
γ c (x) := | {δ ∩ I ∈ I | πcδ (x) = 0 and πcδ (z) ≥ πcδ (x) for all z ∈ A with
πcδ (z) = 0} |.
In order to describe a function that fails to satisfy district consistency, we consider
the set of parties that are preferred most in the largest number of constituencies. A func-
tion that satisfies all properties but district consistency is the function that ranks these
parties first and ranks all other parties second. In order to give a formal description of
this rule, consider X1 := {x ∈ A | ∀y = x[τcδ (x) ≥ τcδ (y)]}.
The function that does not satisfy district consistency is the function F4 : L(A)I
→ W (A), for I ⊆ V , defined by: (i) for all x, y ∈ X1, x ∼F4(c) y, (ii) for all
z, u ∈ A\X1, z ∼F4(c) u, (iii) for all x ∈ X1 and z ∈ A\X1, x F4(c) z. unionsq
Also the properties mentioned in Theorem 2 are independent.
Proposition 10 Subset consistency, district consistency, subset anonymity, neutral-
ity, topsonlyness, Pareto optimality and the district cancellation property are
independent.
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Proof The function F3 satisfies all these properties but subset consistency.
A function that satisfies all properties but district consistency is the function F4.
A function that does not satisfy subset anonymity but does satisfy the other axioms
is the function that counts in each district the vote of one particular voter twice. For-
mally, for each δ ∈ , let jδ be the largest element in δ and define for all x ∈ A, for
i ∈ δ, (i) π ′ci (x) = 2 if i = jδ and t (ci ) = x , (ii) πci (x) = 1 if i = jδ and t (ci ) = x ,(iii) πci = 0 in all other cases. The function that is not subset anonymous is the function
F5 : L(A)I → W (A), for I ⊆ V , defined by x F5(c) y, iff, 	c (x) > 	c (y) and
x ∼F5(c) y, iff, 	c (x) = 	c (y), where 	c (x) :=| {δ ∩ I ∈ I | π ′cδ (x) ≥ π ′cδ (y)
for all y ∈ A} |.
A function that is not neutral is the function that differs from F PT P in the fact
that for a certain party z, party z is ranked before the other parties if party z is preferred
most in an absolute majority of the constituencies, or else this party z is ranked last.
Formally, this is a function F6 : L(A)I → W (A), for I ⊆ V , defined by, for z ∈ A,
if τc (z) > 1/2 |  |, then z F6 y for all y ∈ A, y = z,
if τc (z) ≤ 1/2 |  |, then z ≺F6 y for all y ∈ A, y = z,
and for x, y ∈ A, x = z, y = z, x F6 y, iff, τc (x) > τc (y) and x ∼F6 y, iff,
τc (x) = τc (y).
A function that satisfies all the properties but topsonlyness is the function F1.
A function that is not Pareto optimal, while satisfying all other properties, is the func-
tion F7 : L(A)I → W (A), for I ⊆ V , defined by x F7 y, iff, τc (x) < τc (y)
and x ∼F7 y, iff, τc (x) = τc (y).
Finally, a function that satisfies all properties but district cancellation is the function
F2. unionsq
7 FPTP and list PR compared
Now that we have found the characteristic properties for FPTP systems modelled as
social preference rules, we may compare these with the characteristic properties that
we found for list PR systems, also modelled as social preference rules, that we found in
Hout (2006). In order to do so, we will specify how the sets of characteristic properties
that were found for both systems, modelled as social preference rules, relate to each
other. We will indicate which properties distinguish FPTP systems from list PR systems
and, on the other hand, what properties distinguish list PR systems from FPTP systems.
In Hout (2006), we found that list PR systems, modelled as the plurality ranking
rule Pl, are characterized by consistency (Con), faithfulness (F), anonymity (A),
neutrality (N) and topsonlyness (T). This is indicated in Table 1, where the char-
acteristic properties have been printed in boldface.
Faithfulness requires of a decision rule that it chooses according to the individual
preference ordering in a one-person situation. A social preference rule will be called
faithful if, in case society consists of a single individual whose most preferred party
is party x , it orders this party x first.
Definition 14 (Faithfulness) Let {i} ⊆ V be a set of voters consisting of a single indi-
vidual. A social preference rule F is faithful if, for all i ∈ N , for all ci ∈ L(P){i},
and for all x ∈ A, if t (ci ) = x , then t (F(ci )) = x .
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Table 1 Properties of list PR systems and FPTP systems
Con SCon DCon F A SA N T PO DCan
List PR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FPTP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
In this article, we found that characteristic properties for FPTP systems are subset
consistency (SCon), district consistency (DCon), subset anonymity (SA), neutrality
(N), topsonlyness (T), Pareto optimality (PO), and district cancellation (DCan); see
again Table 1.
In this section, we will show that
(1) subset consistency (SCon) and district consistency (DCon) are implied by con-
sistency (Con),
(2) Pareto optimality (PO) is implied by consistency (Con), faithfulness (F), ano-
nymity (A), neutrality (N) and topsonlyness (T), all taken together, and
(3) subset anonymity (SA) is implied by anonymity (A).
Hence, the Plurality ranking rule Pl satisfies all the characteristic properties of F PT P
except district cancellation (DCan), as shown in Counterexample 3.
On the other hand, we will show that faithfulness (F) is implied by Pareto optimality
(PO). Hence, FPTP systems satisfies all characteristic properties of the Plurality rank-
ing rule except consistency (Con) and anonymity (A), as shown in counterexample 1
and 4 respectively.
As we can read from Table 1, this means that anonymity (A) and consistency (Con)
are the characteristic properties that distinguish list PR systems from FPTP systems.
On the other hand, this means that district cancellation (DCan) is the characteristic
property that distinguishes FPTP systems from list PR systems.
It is easy to verify that consistency implies district consistency. These are in fact very
similar conditions, with the sole difference that district consistency implies additional
requirements on the different sets of voters.
Proposition 11 If F is consistent (Con), then F is district consistent (DCon).
Proof By consistency, whenever c ∈ L(A)I , c′ ∈ L(A)J are preference profiles for
disjoint sets of voters I ⊆ V and J ⊆ V and c + c′ is the profile on I ∪ J that corre-
sponds with c on I and with c′ on J , for all x, y ∈ A, if x F(c) y and x F(c′) y,
then x F(c+c′) y.
This means that this is certainly the case whenever I ⊆ V and J ⊆ V are such that
for all δ ∈ , δ ∩ I = ∅ implies δ ∩ J = ∅, and c + c′ is the profile on I ∪ J , that
corresponds with c on I and with c′ on J . unionsq
We are also able to show that, if we assume that disjoint subsets of constituencies do
not share more than one element in the top of their social orderings, subset consistency
(SCon) is implied by consistency (Con).
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Proposition 12 Let I δ ⊆ δ ⊆ V and J δ ⊆ δ ⊆ V be disjoint subsets of one sin-
gle constituency δ. Let for all cδ ∈ L(A)I δ and c′δ ∈ L(A)J
δ
and for all x, y ∈ A,
x ∈ t (F(cδ)) and y ∈ t (F(cδ)) implies that either x /∈ t (F(c′δ)) or y /∈ t (F(c′δ)).
If F is consistent, then F is subset consistent.
Proof Let I δ ⊆ δ ⊆ V and J δ ⊆ δ ⊆ V be disjoint subsets of one single constitu-
ency δ. Let cδ ∈ L(A)I δ and c′δ ∈ L(A)J
δ be preference profiles for I δ and J δ , and
cδ + c′δ be the profile on I δ ∪ J δ that corresponds with cδ on I δ and with c′δ on J δ .
Suppose for all cδ ∈ L(A)I δ and c′δ ∈ L(A)J
δ
and for all x, y ∈ A, x ∈ t (F(cδ))
and y ∈ t (F(cδ)) implies that either x /∈ t (F(c′δ)) or y /∈ t (F(c′δ))(*). Sup-
pose t (F(cδ)) ∩ t (F(c′δ)) = ∅ and suppose F is consistent. We should prove that
t (F(cδ + c′δ)) = t (F(cδ)) ∩ t (F(c′δ)).
We first show that t (F(cδ)) ∩ t (F(c′δ)) ⊆ t (F(cδ + c′δ)). Let x ∈ t (F(cδ)) ∩
t (F(c′δ)). Then by (*), for all z ∈ A, either (i) x F(cδ) z and x F(c′δ) z, or (ii)
x ∼F(cδ) z and x F(c′δ) z, or (iii) x F(cδ) z and x ∼F(c′δ) z.
In either case, by consistency, x F(cδ+c′δ) z. Hence, if x ∈ t (F(cδ))∩t (F(c′δ)),
then x ∈ t (F(cδ + c′δ)).
Conversely, suppose z ∈ t (F(cδ + c′δ)). Let x ∈ t (F(cδ)) ∩ t (F(c′δ)). If
z /∈ t (F(cδ)) or z /∈ t (F(c′δ)), then either (i) x F(cδ) z and x ∼F(c′δ) z, or(ii) x ∼F(cδ) z and x F(c′δ) z, or (iii) x F(cδ) z and x F(c′δ) z.
In either case, by consistency, x F(cδ+c′δ) z. This contradicts z ∈ t (F(cδ + c′δ)).
Hence, z ∈ t (F(cδ)) and z ∈ t (F(c′δ)). 
Next we show that Pareto optimality is implied by consistency, faithfulness, ano-
nymity, neutrality and topsonlyness. This follows from the fact that these conditions
imply the plurality ranking rule and the plurality ranking rule in its turn satisfies Pareto
optimality.
Proposition 13 If F is consistent, faithful, anonymous, neutral and topsonly, then
F is Pareto optimal.
Proof In Hout (2006), it is shown that if F is consistent, faithful, anonymous, neutral
and topsonly, then F is the plurality ranking rule D. D satisfies Pareto optimality:
Let x, y ∈ A, let I ⊆ V , and let c ∈ L(A)I be such that x ci y for all i ∈ I . Then
πc(y) = 0 and πc(z) > 0 for at least one z ∈ A, z = y. Thus, y /∈ t (D(c)). unionsq
It is easy to see that subset anonymity is implied by anonymity.
Proposition 14 If F is anonymous (A), then F is subset anonymous (SA).
Proof If for each set of voters I , and for every permutation σ if I , F(c◦σ) = F(c),
then certainly this is the case whenever I = I δ ⊆ δ, with δ ∈ . 
Finally, it is also easy to verify that Faithfulness is implied by Pareto optimality.
Proposition 15 If F is Pareto optimal (PO), then F is faithful (F).
Proof If I = {i} is a set of voters consisting of one single individual and t (ci ) = x ,
then for all i ∈ I , x ci y for all y ∈ A, y = x . Thus, by Pareto optimality,
y /∈ t (F(ci )) for all y ∈ A, y = x . Hence, t (F(ci )) = {x}. unionsq
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8 Conclusion
In this article, we found characterizations for FPTP systems modelled as social pref-
erence rules. We were able to show that a social preference rule is an FPTP system, if
and only if, it satisfies four properties: subset consistency and district consistency, the
subset cancellation property and the district cancellation property. We also proved that
subset cancellation is implied by four deeper properties, named as subset anonymity,
neutrality, topsonlyness and Pareto optimality. This gives us a second characterization
of an FPTP system.
Next, we compared the characteristic properties we found for FPTP systems to the
characteristic properties of list PR systems, modelled as the plurality ranking rule, that
we found in Hout (2006). We showed that list PR and FPTP systems have the following
properties in common (see Table 1): subset consistency, district consistency, faithful-
ness, subset anonymity, neutrality, topsonlyness and Pareto optimality. Furthermore,
we showed that consistency and anonymity are the characteristic properties of list PR
systems that distinguish them from FPTP systems. The other way round, we showed
that the characteristic property of FPTP systems that distinguishes them from list PR
systems is district cancellation.
As a consequence, provided that we want a rule to satisfy all the properties that they
share, a defence of list PR systems against FPTP systems should be based on an argu-
ment why consistency and anonymity are more important than district cancellation.
Similarly, a defence of FPTP systems against list PR systems should be based on an
argument why district cancellation is more important than consistency and anonymity,
given that we want a rule to satisfy all the shared properties.
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